In (2010) Douglas Berger defends a new reading of Mūlamadhyamakārikā XXIV: 18, arguing that most contemporary translators mistranslate the important term prajñaptir upādāya, misreading it as a compound indicating dependent designation or something of the sort, instead of taking it simply to mean this notion, once acquired. He attributes this alleged error, pervasive in modern scholarship, to Candrakīrti, who, Berger correctly notes, argues for the interpretation he rejects.

Berger’s analysis, and the reading of the text he suggests grounded on that analysis, is insightful and fascinating, and certainly generates an understanding of Nāgārjuna’s enterprise welcome amid the profusion of such understandings. We have learned much from it. The central argument, nonetheless, is vitiated by two significant fallacies, to which we draw attention, not in order to refute Berger’s reading, but to indicate that the more generally accepted reading should not be discarded on the strength of this argument.

First, in arguing for his new translation of prajñaptir upādāya, Berger adduces many other occurrences of the term prajñapti in Mūlamadhyamakārikā, occurrences in which it indeed has the ordinary sense of concept, or idea, notion. He argues (48-49) on this basis that we should not take it to mean any more than this in XXIV:18. Fair
enough. But in none of those occurrences does prajñapti occur in the context of the phrase at issue, viz., prajñaptir upādāya, and it is this unusual occurrence that concerns us. The lexical argument is thus at least a non sequitur.

Furthermore, all canonical Tibetan translations of prajñaptir upādāya render it is brten nas gdags pa, which can only be glossed as a noun derived from two terms connected by an ablative particle, i.e. dependence [abl] designation, and should be translated as dependent designation (or as one of the many rough equivalents chosen by the many Western translators Berger criticizes).

Of course, Berger might reply that all of these Tibetan translators, like their Western successors, were in thrall to Candrakīrti. But that would be a desperate argument for at least two reasons. First, Candrakīrti’s star had not yet risen to the zenith it would occupy in Tibet, and there is little evidence of his thought having substantial impact in India during this period. Now, to be sure, Tibetan translations c 9th Century do not by any means clinch the case, but the fact that these translations were all produced by teams of eminent Indian pandits and eminent Tibetan scholars, and that they are unanimous should carry some weight.

The second reason takes us to Berger’s second fallacy. Berger charges that Candrakīrti is to blame. (51-56) But this can’t be right. It is very hard to make sense of Buddhapālita’s 5th century commentary following Berger’s interpretation. Indeed Pandey (2:202) reconstructs the phrase Buddhapālita’s brten nas gdags pa as
pratītyaveditavyaḥ ("to be understood as dependent"). Bhāvaviveka also writes before Candrakīrti, and indeed Candrakīrti takes issue with much of Bhāvaviveka's reading of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. But Candrakīrti agrees with Bhāvaviveka about how to read XXIV: 18. In Prajñāpradīpa, glossing the term in question in the context of the verse in question, he writes: “Here, brten nas gdags pa(prajñaptir upādāya) means mundane and transcendental conventional expressions. Thus, it means designation on the basis of the aggregates. (brten nas gdags pa ste/ ’jig rten pa dang ’jig rten las ’das pa’i tha snyad ’dod pas nye bas len pa dag la brten nas gdags pa yin no//)[230b]

The fact that Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka disagree about so much lends force to their agreement on this point. The fact that such great Indian pandits, including both of these figures as well as Buddhapālita, and as we shall now see, Piṅ gala, writing in a cultural milieu so much closer to that of Nāgārjuna than is ours agree on this reading suggests that we might wisely defer to their understanding of these terms, particularly when taken in the context of both these early Indian Madhyamaka commentaries.

But we can go a bit further, calling on the corroboration by an authoritative Chinese translation by an eminent Indian scholar. In one of the earliest extant commentaries on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā the Chung-lun(中論) translated by Kumārajīva in 409 CE Piṅ gala (C. 4th C CE) comments on this verse, and in particular on the term jia ming (假名, prajñaptir upādāya), treated by Kumārajīva in translation as a single technical
term, as follows: “Emptiness, furthermore, is also empty. It is only in order to guide and to instruct sentient beings that he explains this by using a provisional designation.” (空亦復空。但為引導眾生故。以假名。Taishō T30.33b17-18, trans. P. Gregory, personal communication). So in what is arguably the earliest Madhyamaka commentary, prajñaptir upādāya is taken in this sense, and Kumārajiva translates it into Chinese in this sense.

We would also like to point out that according to Berger "Candrakīrti’s" reading (which, we argue, is part of the commentarial tradition at least since the 4th century) is not just philologically unsound, but also unsatisfactory from a philosophical perspective. He asserts that:

- if we adopted Candrakīrti’s declaration that language lends us nothing more than conceptual constructions, it would be difficult to understand why such corrections would be required and how they would be distinguished as more true to the way the world works than alternative constructions.

Nāgārjuna for his own part extols the teachings of enlightened beings above precisely because those teachings bestow upon us an understanding of what action does as opposed to what it does not do; otherwise there would be no reason to call the teachings praised by enlightened beings “truth” (dharma). (57)
But there are of course many reasons that insights of the Buddhas,
Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas are better than an ordinary person’s construction
of the world, and none of these require us to say that their verbal expression is
more than conventional, dependent designation, and in particular that they
accurately represent ultimate reality. Nāgārjuna stresses repeatedly (e.g. in vv 52-
56 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī) that Buddhist teachings such as those specifying
which things are auspicious (kuśala) and which are inauspicious do not have to
be understood as accounts "true to the way the world works,"in fact, regarding
them as having their nature substantially (svabhāvatas) would contradict the
Buddha's own teaching. (See Westerhoff 2010) The value of the teaching of
enlightened beings can be understood without interpreting them as true in a
correspondence-theoretic sense. (See also Garfield 2002, c. 3) Some more skillful,
more illuminating constructions might just be better in bringing us to see that no
construction is ultimately true. That is the nature of upāya.

Of course Piṅ gala, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti, as well as Kumārajiva
and all of the great Indian and Tibetan translators who compiled the Tibetan canon,
and all other Western scholars who followed them might be wrong about the
meaning of the crucial term prajñaptir upādāya, and Berger might be right. But we
place our faith here in the tradition.

References

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Bhāvaviveka, *Prajñāpradīpāmūlamadhyamakakārikārti, sDe dge dBo ma tsha 45b4-259b3.*


*Zhonglun* 中論 (Treatise on the Middle Way), Taishō Tripiṭaka, Vol. 30, No. 1564, Kumārajīva trs, dtd 409, w/ commentary by Piṅ gala